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ABSTRACT
We investigate the relation between management ownership and corporate per-
formance, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a cross-section of Fortune 500 firms,
Tobin's Q first increases and then declines as board of directors holdings rise.
For older firms there is weak evidence that Q is lower when a firm is run by a
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Chicago, IL 606371.Introduction
Many large American corporations are not run by the people who own them.
As stressed by Berle and Means (1932), when managers hold little equity in the
firm and shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value-maximization, corporate
assets may be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. According
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), these costs of deviation from value-maximization
decline as management ownership rises. As their stakes rise, managers pay for a
greater share of the costs of their on-the-job consumption1 and are less likely
to squander corporate wealth. According to this "convergence of interestst'
hypothesis, corporate performance improves with increases in management ownership.
More recently, Oemsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) have pointed out
offsetting costs of significant ownership by management. These writers
recognized that, when a manager owns only a small stake, market discipline (e.g.
the managerial labor market (Fama, 1980), the product market (Hart, 1983), and
the market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983)) may still force him
toward value maximization. In contrast, a manager who controls a substantial
fraction of his firm's equity may have enough voting power to guarantee his
future employment with the firm at an attractive salary2. He may then indulge
his tastes for on-the-job consumption, although perhaps to a more limited extent
than if he had effective control of the firm but did not have any claim to its
cash flows3. This "entrenchment" hypothesis predicts that performance declines
as management's stake increases beyond the point where control challenges are
still effective.
As the above discussion suggests, theoretical arguments alone cannot unam-
biguously predict the relationship between management ownership and corporate
performance. While the "convergence of interests" hypothesis predicts a uni-—2-
formly positive relation, the "entrenchment" hypothesis predicts a decline in
performance for sufficiently high management stakes. In this paper, we study
the relation between managerial ownership and performance empirically.
In section 2, we look at the relation between two measures of the firm's
performance (Tobin's Q and profit rate) and the shareholdings of its board of
directors. A related study was conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who esti-
mated a linear relationship between profit rate and ownership by large share-
holders (as opposed to just management), and found no correlation. We estimate
a nonlinear relationship between management ownership and performance to capture
the possible presence of both the "convergence of interests" and "entrenchment"
effects. We also attempt to evaluate a number of reasons why the observed rela-
tionship might be spurious.
Section 3 takes a more disaggregated look at the relation between manage-
ment ownership and performance. First, we segregate ownership by top corporate
officers from that of other board members and evaluate the impact of ownership
by these two distinct groups on performance. In part, this is done to address
a frequently made claim that outside board members are puppets of top offi-
cers. Second, we evaluate the impact on corporate performance of having a
founding family on the board of directors. We do this because we are
interested in the possibility that a management team can become entrenched for
reasons other than the number of voting shares it controls.
Section 4 summarizes our findings.—3—
2. The Relationship Between Board Ownership and Performance.
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between board ownership and
performance in a sample of large industrial firms. For this purpose, we use a
December, 1980 listing of the names and stakes of large shareholders of 456 of
the Fortune 500 firms supplied by Corporate Data Exchange (CDE). The CUE
identified shareholders who were members of the board of directors, with the
exception of those whose stakes were below .2%. While this means that, in large
firms, positions worth millions of dollars are not reported, the CUE numbers are
still very useful for examining issues of corporate control, since board members
holding less than .2% are never among our firms' largest shareholders.
To measure performance, we rely mainly on average Tobin's Q,equalto the
ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its physical
assets. Tobin's Qishigh when the firm has valuable intangible assets in
addition to physical capital, such as monopoly power (Lindenberg and Ross,
1981), goodwill, a stock of patents, or good managers. While Qisundoubtedly a
very noisy signal of managerial performance, we believe that it is well-suited
to our purpose. Because we are interested in the predictable effects of a
firm's ownership structure on its value, it seems natural to look at the
cross-sectional relation between ownership and value. One alternative might be
to study events that represent large unexpected changes in ownership structure
for which there is no accompanying news to contaminate the experiment. But
large changes in ownership structure are fairly rare, except for those
accompanying control challenges, where there is clearly much more going on. For
this reason, we feel justified in concentrating on a cross-sectional analysis of
measures such as Qandthe profit rate.The measure of Q we employ was obtained from the Griliches R & D master
file (Cummins, Kall and Laderman, 1982) for 1980. The numerator of Q is the
firm's market value, defined as the sum of the actual market value of common
stock and estimated market values of preferred stock and debt4. The denominator
of Q is the replacement cost of the firm's plant and inventories, A, also taken
from the R & D master file. Values of Q are not available for 85 firms, pri-
marily because of difficulty in obtaining values of long term debt, and, in some
cases, the replacement cost, A. While we cannot be sure that such sample selec-
tion does not bias our results, the omitted firms do not appear to be very dif-
ferent from the included ones in any observable respect5. Our final sample
consists of 371 firms.
In this sample, the mean combined stake of all board members is 10.6%. The
median stake, however, is only 3.4%, suggesting that the distribution is skewed.
Indeed, in 103 firms (28% of the sample), total board holdings added to no more
than 1% of outstanding equity, and in 46 of our firms (12% of the sample), no
board member owned more than 0.2% of the firm. Nonetheless, in 31% of our
sample the board owned more than 10% of the firm; and in 20% of the sample the
board owned more than 20% of the firm. These numbers accord with the findings
of Lewellyn (1971) and Denisetz and Lehn (1985) who also document the prevalence
of significant managerial ownership in the United States. These results also
corroborate the hypothesis of Fama and Jensen (1983) that firms in which
management owns over 50% of the equity (and thus has complete control) should
have a hard time surviving as organizations. In fact, there are only 14 such
firms in our sample6.
Table 1 presents means of Q for different levels of the board's percentage—5—
ownership (the mean Q in the sample is .85, with a standard deviation of .67).
It suggests that, at low levels of ownership, higher stakes are associated with
higher Q's.It also records a decline of Q for substantial ownership positions,
although outliers strongly affect average Q in some cells. In particular, the
35%-40% ownership cell includes Hewlett-Packard with Q=3.21 and Searle with
Q=1.72, which together account for the mean Q in that cell being 1.06.
Similarly, Dow-Jones alone, with Q=2.58, accounts for the mean Q of 1.46 in the
60-65% cell. While Table 1 suggests that the relationship between ownership and
Q might be nonlinear, it also highlights the need for controlling for some sour-
ces of heterogeneity across firms, particularly industry.
In our econometric work, it would be impractical to use as many cells of
ownership levels as appear in Table 1, primarily because of the scarcity of
observations in some cells. Instead, we consider only four categories of
ownership levels, and estimate regressions using dummies for these categories.
Specifically, we define:
BOARDOO =1if holdings of no board member exceed .2%
=0otherwise
BOARDO5 =Iif total reported board holdings are between 0% and 5%
=0otherwise
BOARD2O =1if total reported board holdings are between 5% and 20%
=0otherwise
BOARD99 =1if total reported board holdings exceed 20%
=0otherwise
Partitioning ownership levels at 0%, 5%, and 20% can be justified as
follows. Firms with close to no board ownership are probably a special group in
which the convergence of interests effect might be the weakest, except for
possible ownership-mimicking incentive contracts. The choice of 5% as the-6-
dividing line between low and moderate ownership is arbitrary, motivated pri-
marily by the benefits of having a large number of observations in both the
BOARDO5 and BOARD2O categories. The choice of 2O as the cutoff for high
ownership stems from our prior belief that bona fide entrenchment should become
important in the 2O-3O range (Weston, 1977), balanced against the need to have
enough observations in that cell. Later in the paper, we consider alternative
specifications.
The first column of Table 2 presents the regression of Tobin's Q on the
board dummies (BOAR000 is omitted). This regression is essentially equivalent
to a comparison of means of Q across ownership cells; the only differences from
Table 1 are the coarser categorization and the calculation of White-consistent
standard errors for the parameter estimates. The regression confirms the
nonlinear pattern of Table 1, with Q's first rising and then declining as board
ownership rises. A simple comparison of means, however, runs into the problem
of omitting other determinants of Q that are correlated with board ownership.
To deal with this problem, we estimate a model that explicitly incorporates
variables that might be correlated with both ownership and Q.
The first type of controls we use are observable measures of intangible
assets that affect Q7. These are (divided by A, to make them compatible with
Q):
• RD/A —1980R & 0 expenditures (COMPUSTAT).
• ADV/A —1980advertising expenditures (COMPUSTAT)8.
In addition to observed assets, we consider several variables that might be
correlated with unobserved intangible assets, as well as with board ownership:
• 0/A —theratio of the calculated market value of a firm's long-term debt—7-
to A. This variable may in part capture the value of corporate tax
shields. Alternatively, according to the pecking-order theory, debt
is negatively correlated with the profitability of the firm, and
hence with Q. Managers of the more leveraged firms might hold a
higher fraction of equity, on average, for the same Q.
• A—replacementcost of assets.'A' measures size; and unobserved
intangible assets of a firm might be correlated with size. Also, it
is hard to own a large part of a bigger firm, raising the possibi-
lity that a large board stake proxies for small firm size.
• S1C31 —threedigit SIC code dummies, used to control for possible spurious
correlation between ownership and Q operating through industry
effects (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
The final equation, hereafter equation (1), takes the form:
RD ADV 0
Q =Ea•SIC3 +. — + .— +•— + •A+yBOARDO5÷y BOARDO5i-y BOARD99
I I 1A2A 3A 4 1 2 3
The estimated coefficients and their heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are shown in the second column of Table 2, while Table 3 presents
t-statistics for the pairwise null hypotheses that the coefficients on the board
ownership dummies are equal.
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that, all other things equal, firms in which
management owns between 5 and 20% have the highest Q's, which exceed the Q's of
firms with negligible board ownership by .206 (t=3.06), the Q's of firms with
negligible to 5% ownership by .085 (t=.91), and the Q's of firms with dominant
ownership by .13 (t=1.61). The second best performing are firms with negligible-8-
to 5% ownership, whose Q's exceed those of firms with negligible ownership by
.201 (t=2.77) and those of firms with dominant ownership by .045 (t=.62). One
interpretation of these findings is that the convergence of interests hypothesis
is the key to understanding the data at lower ownership levels, while the
entrenchment hypothesis is operative for large board ownership.
Some potential difficulties with these regressions concern 1) the arbitra-
riness of the specification, 2) the stability of results over time, 3) the
effect of wealth constraints on managerial ownership, and 4) the omission of a
measure of growth opportunities from the right hand side of equation (1). We
presently address these issues.
To some extent, our choice of where to partition ownership cells is
arbitrary. To judge the robustness of our results, we estimated equation (1)
using different cutoff levels.In particular, in addition to separating low
from moderate ownership at 5%, we did so at 2.5% and at 7.5%; and in addition to
separating moderate from high ownership at 20%, we did so at 15% and 25%. The
results of these regressions, with and without controlling for other variables,
support the following conclusions9. If the range of low ownership is defined as
either 0-2.5% or 0-5%, then Q's in the low ownership cell are significantly
lower than Q's in the moderate ownership cell (i.e., 2.5—20% or 5—20%).
However, there is no support for an increase in Q as ownership rises from 7.5%
to 20%. Further, there is evidence of a significant decline in Q as board
ownership increases from somewhere between 15-20% to about 25%. The decline
seems essentially complete when board ownership reaches 25%.
Because we only have ownership data for 1980, the stability of our results
over time is in question. As a crude test of stability, we obtained 1979 and-9-
1981 Q's for the firms in our 1980 sample, and ran the regression in the second
column of Table 2 with Q for 1979 and with Q for 1981 as the dependent
variables, but with 1980 values of all the independent variables. Because
ownership is relatively stable over time, these regressions should be at least
suggestive of the stability of our results over time. The results in fact are
quite similar to the findings in Table 2.10
The next issue is the effect of wealth constraints on managerial ownership.
If a management team is wealth constrained, it can only afford to own a large
proportion of the equity if average Q, and hence the market value of the firm,
is low. That is, the managers might only be able to afford to own a large stake
in a poorly performing firm. This argument predicts that there will be a
spurious negative correlation between the proportion of equity owned by the
board and Q.It therefore only strengthens our finding of the positive correla-
tion of Q and ownership at lower ownership levels. On the other hand, this
spurious negative correlation might account for our finding that Q falls as
board ownership becomes very large.
To subject this issue to some empirical scrutiny, consider the relation
between board ownership and the replacement cost of the firm, A. Holding
leverage constant, market value can be lower either because Q is low or because
the firm has fewer assets, i.e., A is low. If lower market value facilitates
larger board ownership, we should see a negative correlation between replacement
cost and the fraction of equity owned by the board. Table 4 presents the values
of A at various levels of board ownership. The relationship is not monotonic,
especially in the range of high board ownership. For firms for which the board
ownership is at least 5%, the correlation between board ownership and A is only-10-
-.02. This correlation points against the view that size is a strong deterrent
to management ownership. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that our
finding of low Q's for firms with very high board ownership is spurious,
evidence on the replacement cost of capital points against this possibility.
Our omission of measures of firm growth rates from Q equations also raises
some important issues. A high Q may in part reflect the value of future growth
opportunities of the firm. If managers own large stakes in younger,
faster-growing firms which tend to have high Qs, then the positive association
between board ownership and Q that we observe might be spurious. On the other
hand, given that fast growth is itself an important component of performance
that depends on the actions of the management, we are probably understating the
effect of management ownership on performance if we focus only on the effect of
management ownership on Q holding growth constant. That is, much of the
variation in Q across different board ownership structures may be due to the
differing values of growth prospects that are achieved by managements with
different incentives to maximize value. With this reservation in mind, we
include the growth rate of the firm's labor force, 6L11, into the regression.
The result is as follows:
RD ADV 0
Q =7.81•— -.029—- .0000021'A-.893•—+ .177•BOARDO5
(2.16)A (.808) A (.0000039) (.378) A (.0705)
+.230•BOARD2O +.119•BOARD99 +2.72'GL R2 =.604
(.0908) (.0743) (.812) N =368
GL enters significantly into the regression and reduces somewhat the size and
statistical significance of the other estimated coefficients. The basic pattern
of increases and subsequent declines in Q's as ownership rises nonetheless—11—
remains, and the estimated coefficients on BOARDO5 and BOARD2O are still
significant at the 95 level.
Finally, we look at the profit rate as an alternative measure of perfor—
mance. The profit rate is defined as the ratio of the firm's net cash flows
(less the inflation-adjusted value of depreciation) to the previously defined
replacement cost of its capital stock, A. The board ownership regressions which
parallel those for Tobin's Qarepresented in the right panel of Table 2.
Although the qualitative pattern of the estImated coefficients on the ownership
dummies is the same as in the Q regressions, the statistical significance of the
estimates is much lower. Only the estimated coefficient on BOARD2O is signifi-
cant at the 95 level. The point estimate for BOARD2O implies that, all other
things equal, firms with 5—20 board ownership have profit rates .017 higher
than those of firms with negligible board ownership, and .012 higher than those
of firms with dominant board ownership. To gauge the magnitudes of these
effects, note that the mean profit rate of the sample is .055 with a standard
deviation of .035.
The above results appear at odds with the finding of Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) of no association between large shareholder ownership and performance.
The important differences between our procedures seem to be twofold. First, we
focus only on the equity stakes of the board of directors, while Demsetz and
Lehn measure concentration of ownership weighting ownership by members of the
board and by other large shareholders equally. To the extent that large
shareholders without board seats represent competing managerial teams, they may
be attracted to firms with poorly performing incumbent management. This
selection effect would tend to reduce the observed correlation between ownership—12—
concentration and performance.
Second, Demsetz and Lehn estimate a linear relationship between ownership
concentration and performance. When we estimate a linear relationship between
their measure of performance (profit rate) and our board stake variable, we get
11 =.055-.005•BOARD,
(.002) (.014)
which is consistent with their result. Even controlling for SIC codes and other
factors In this regression does not yield a significant estimated coefficient
on the board stake variable. We are led to conclude that Demsetz and Lehn's
failure to find a relationship between ownership concentration and profitability
may have been due to their use of a linear specification that does not capture
what appears to be an important nonlinearity.-13-
3. The Composition of the Board
So far we have assumed that the impact of the board's ownership stake on
performance is independent of who owns that stake. This might not always be
appropriate, for at least two reasons. First, ownership by officers and by
outside directors might have different effects. Second, at any given level of
ownership, leadership by the firm's founders or by their descendants might
have different effects on performance than leadership by officers who are not
related to the founders. In this section, we examine these two hypotheses.
The distinction between officers and outside board members might be
important for several reasons. While it is the fiduciary duty of all direc-
tors to represent the interests of shareholders, outside directors in par-
ticular must oversee the performance of the firm's officers. But monitoring
the performance of top officers requires time and effort.In addition, an
outside director serving on a board dominated by officers with more expertise
and influence over votes, risks losing his position if he objects to these
officers' choices. Without a personal financial interest in the firm or
control over a large block of votes, an outside director may be reluctant to
second guess poor corporate decisions. Presumably, the extent of the outside
directors' role in disciplining officers is positively related to the equity
stakes of the former.
For officers, the ownership stake is only a partial indicator of their
interest in the financial success of the firm. Officers also get significant
salaries, bonuses and incentive plans (Murphy, 1985) and may be subject to the
discipline of the managerial labor market (Fama, 1980)12. In addition, top
officers sometimes exercise virtually complete control over their firms with-14--
only small stakes, since their familiarity with the business and tenure with
the firm enables them to dominate the board regardless of their personal equity
ownership. These considerations suggest that the equity holdings of officers
and outside board members might have different effects on performance.
Our analysis here parallels that of the previous section. By examining
the 1980 annual reports of our 371 firms, we identified the two senior cor-
porate officers of each firm. Returning to the CDE's listing of stock holdings,
we constructed a new variable (OFFICER) giving the holdings of these top offi-
cers, who were usually the chairman and the president13. The holdings of the
remainder of the board of directors are denoted OUTBOARD. That variable there-
fore includes the holdings of junior officers, such as vice—presidents. Since
junior officers generally own very little stock, this classification is unlikely
to make much difference.
The two top officers owned 6.3% of their firms on average. In 117 firms
(32% of our sample), however, their stake was negligible; and their median
stake was approximately one half of one percent. In 60 firms (16% of our
sample) their holdings were in excess of 10%, and in 43 firms (12% of our
sample) their stake exceeded 20%.
The mean value of the OUTBOARD variable was 4.4%, with only 97 firms
(26% of the total) having negligible outside board ownership. The median -for
OUTBOARD was just under one percent, and was thus greater than that of the
OFFICER variable. In 50 firms (13% of the sample) the outside board's holdings
exceeded 10%, and in 24 firms (6% of the sample), its stake surpassed 20%.
Column 1 of Table 5 contains the results of regressions of Q on ownership
variables alone as in Column 1 of Table 2, but with a separate set of dummy—15—
variables for the top two officers' stake and for the stake of the rest of the
board. In Column 2 of Table 5, we report the results of controlling for
industry effects and other determinants of Q. Although the pattern of point
estimates in columns 1. and 2 is consistent with firm value being maximized at
moderately high levels of ownership, the estimates are not reliable enough to
draw any solid conclusions. Still, it is worth noting that the results for the
outer board more closely resemble the results for the board as a whole than do
the top officer results. The pattern of point estimates for top officer holdings
may reflect the absence of significant unexploited gains from raising their
holdings. This is not the case for outside board holdings. This difference is
consistent with the importance of non-ownership-based compensation for top offi-
cers, but not for outside directors. It is also consistent with the argument
that officers and free-riding shareholders will make it difficult for outside
board members to profitably increase their stakes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
In the previous discussion, we have explored share ownership as a means
to managerial entrenchment. But managers can become entrenched even without
control over a large block of votes, especially in firms where the founder is a
top officer14. Since founders presumably have a special claim to control of their
firms, they might be instrumental in selecting the board or otherwise become
entrenched even with small stakes. At the same time, the entrepreneurial abi-
lity of the founder can be a valuable asset, at least early in the life of the
firm.
To discriminate between firms in which the founding family might supply
entrepreneurial talent, and firms in which such families might only reduce
corporate wealth, we estimate different founder effects for old and young—16-
firms. In particular, we reestimate the Tobin's Q regressions including a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if a member of the founding family15 is one of the
top two officers and another dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the founding
family is top management and the firm was first incorporated in 1950 or later16.
This specification aims to capture the impact of the founding family on the
firm's performance independent of its stake. The results for the combined board
holdings regression provide some confirmation of the expected founder effects:
RD ADV D
Q =8.22•— + .115•— — .910•— — .00000154•A




(.0791) (.167) N 371
For pre-1950 firms, the presence of the founding family at the top of the
management team is associated with a Tobin's Q that is .125 lower on average.
However, the t-statistic for this difference is only -1.58, so the result must
be interpreted with caution. The estimated coefficient on FOUNDER5O indicates
that the effect of the founding family on Q is .351 greater in newer firms than
it is in older firms. This difference is reliably different from zero with a
t—statistic of 2.10. On the other hand, one cannot confidently conclude that
the net effect of the founding family in newer firms (the sum of the two dummy
coefficients), estimated to be .226, is different from zero (t=1.24).
Unfortunately, results for the regression in which we segregate the
holdings of top officers and other board members are plagued by—17-
multicollinearity. For example, of the 40 firms with top officer stakes between
5 and 20%, 31 have a founding family member as a top officer, and of the 43
firms with top officer stakes of more than 20%, 38 have a founding family
member as a top officer. Finally, these two groups account for 69 of the 88
firms with FOUNDER=1. The regression results are:
RD ADV 0
Q= 8.56•— + .023•— — .930•— — .00000249•A
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4. Conclusion.
In this paper, we examined two well-known hypotheses concerning the impact
of managerial ownership on a firm's performance. The "convergence of interests"
hypothesis suggests that agency costs should fall, and performance should
improve, as the management's stake rises. We found support for this hypothesis
in the O-1O range of ownership by the board of directors, although our results
seem to be driven more strongly by holdings of the outside board members than by
holdings of top officers. The "entrenchment" hypothesis predicts a decline of
performance when managers are protected against the discipline of the market and
are thus free to pursue their own objectives instead of value-maximization. We
find evidence for this hypothesis based on lower levels of performance for firms
with very large management holdings and on the finding that founding families
have a negative impact on performance of older firms.
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that our results can be
explained by factors other than the "convergence of interests" and
"entrenchment" hypotheses. Alternative explanations may have to do with the
joint behavior of performance and management holdings over the corporate
life-cycle, a spurious correlation between fraction of equity owned by
management and market value induced by wealth constraints, or signalling
hypotheses such as that of Leland and Pyle (1977). In addition, a theory
predicting a nonlinear relationship beween management ownership and performance
of the type that we have found has been proposed by Stulz (1986).In his
theory, management's preference for control and consequent refusal to tender
their shares forces acquirers to pay higher premia to gain control when the
management's stake -is higher, and may lead to an increase in the target firm's-19-
ex ante value. When the management stake is so large that no takeovercan be
profitable, however, the ex ante firm value includes no takeoverpremium, and is
therefore low. While Stulz's story differs from Jensen andMeckling's at the
lower end of management ownership, it is closely related to the"entrenchment
hypothesis" at the higher end.
Because of the nature of our data, this paper has not dealt with several
important issues that might be fruitfully pursued in future research. First,
we have focused on very large (and therefore usually older)corporations. In
newer, faster growing firms, managerial holdings may play a more important
signalling role than they are likely to play for our firms. Moreover, as our
results have suggested, founders of younger firms might have animportant
leadership role to play. Research on ownership structure can doubtless benefit
from considering smaller firms as well. Second, a betteranalysis of the
impact of officers' stakes on performance would incorporate other compensation
data. Important work in this area is Murphy (1985). Finally, on botha
theoretical and empirical level, it is very important to learn how members of
boards of directors with different individual ownership positions interact, and
how the distribution of ownership among board members affects performance.Our
work essentially assumed a good deal of unanimity on the board; a morecomplex
story is surely appropriate.FOOTNOTES
1• On-the-job consumption is a generic term that can refer to shirking and
taking managerial perquisites, but also encompasses pursuit of non-value-
maximizing objectives such as sales maximization (empire building), clean
environment, or the maximization of employee welfare.
2 Numerous studies have shown that control is valued. For example, DeAngelo
and DeAngelo (1985) find that, among 45 large corporations with dual classes of
common stock entitled to identical cash flows but carrying different voting
rights, top managers own a median of 56.9 of the votes but only 24 of the com-
mon stock cash flows. Loderer and Zimmerman (1985), using Swiss data, find that
non-voting issues are priced lower than voting issues.
3.In line with this point, Walkling and Long (1984) find that the larger is
the officers' financial gain from a takeover, the less likely they are to
resist a bid. At the same time, managerial ownership lessens the firm's
vulnerability to a hostile takeover: Weston (1977) reported that no firm where
insiders owned over 3O had ever been acquired through a hostile takeover.
4. The market value of common stock is taken from the Standard and Poor's
Compustat tape. The market value of preferred stock is estimated by dividing
the preferred stock dividend figure (reported in Compustat) by the Moody's
preferred dividend rate for median risk companies. The market value of the
firm's debt is taken as the value of its short term liabilities net of its short
term assets (from Compustat) plus an estimate of the market value of its long
term debt. Estimates of long term debt for our firms were obtained from the
N.B.E.R.'s R & 0 Master File (Cummins, Hall and Laderman, 1982). These estima-
tes are constructed on the assumption that all long term debt has an original
maturity of twenty years, and using a matrix of bond prices in year t for bonds—2—
due in year s from the Moody's corporate BAA bond price series. Theage struc-
ture of corporate debt is estimated from changes in the firm's book value of
long term debt in each of the twenty previous years on the Compustattape.
Using this age structure estimate and the bond price matrix, Cummins et al
(1982) calculate the value of each firm's long term debt.
We have calculated some descriptive statistics on the sample of 85 firms for
which we have ownership data, but do not have market-value-based measures ofQ
(omitted firms). The mean board stake for these firms is 12.0% (it is 10.6% for
the sample of 371 firms we study). Among omitted firms, 25% are runby founding
families; among included firms, this number is 24%. From the viewpoint of
ownership, therefore, omitted firms do not appear exceptional.As a further
check that omission from the sample is not systematic, we calculated the ratio
of the replacement cost of the omitted firm to the mean replacement cost in its
(3-digit SIC) industry. The average of this ratio among omitted firms is .95.
Finally, we calculated the ratio of the book-value-based Q of the omitted firm
to the mean book-value-based Q in its (3-digit SIC) industry. The mean of this
number for the 51 omitted firms that we can calculate it for is .98. Again,
omitted firms do not appear exceptional.
6Virtually all Fortune 500 firms are listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
where listing rules require sufficiently dispersed ownership. This might
explain why very few firms in our sample are more than 50% owned by management.
In a previous draft, we also included the value of the firm's unfunded
vested pension liabilities. This substantially reduced the sample because of
missing data. While the inclusion of this variable "improved" our results, it













board ownership firms, and that the improvement was therefore spurious.
Excluding the pension debt variable thus gives us a larger and less biased
sample.
8 For 17 observations, data were not available on the firm's advertising
expense either for 1980 or for adjacent years. In those cases, we took the
firm's advertising to asset ratio to be the industry average (at the 3—digit SIC
level).
For each regression, define new board ownership variables by analogy with
the way they are defined in the text. The negligible ownership dummy is omitted
in each case. Using the same control variables as in equation (1), we obtain
the following point estimates and White-consistent standard errors for our























11 The growth rate in the firm's labor force is a geometric mean of the per-
cent change in its labor force from one year to the next from 1970 to 1980.
For 62 firms, this calculation could not be made. For 59 of those, we set GL
equal to the mean rate of growth in the firm's 3-digit SIC industry. Three firms
are omitted from the regression because GL could not be imputed in this way.
12 Lewellen (1971) nonetheless reports that top managers get four times as
much of their income from ownership income as from other forms of compensation.
13 In a few cases, either only one of the positions of Chairman and President
existed for that firm, or the same person occupied both positions. In those
cases, the OFFICER variable is the stake of the one top officer.
14 Consistent with this hypothesis, Johnson et al. (1985) find that sudden
deaths of chief executives are accompanied by price increases in their firms'
stocks when those executives are founders, but not otherwise.
15 We identified the founders and their families using a history of annual
reports dating back to either the incorporation of the firm or the turn of the
century, whichever was more recent.
16 Year of incorporation is in most cases taken to be the year of the first
incorporation of the firm obtained from Moody's Industrial Manuals. In a few
cases, Moody's noted a large discrepancy between the year the business was
established and the year of first incorporation. The establishment year was
used in those cases.REFERENCES
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Mean values of Tobin's Q for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980 grouped by










negligiblea 46 .710 .0566
0- 5 171 .879 .0601
5—10 38 .997 .0948
10-15 27 .888 .129
15-20 15 .990 .205
20-25 22 .756 .0804
25-30 9 .588 .0895
30-35 6 .658 .0990
35-40 11 1.060 .243
40-45 6 .778 .243
45-50 6 .538 .0991
50-55 4 .440 .0837
55—60 3 .428 .162
60-65 3 1.460 .568
65-70% 1 .283 —
70-75% 2 .489 .198
75—60% 1 .937 —
a. Negligible board stake means that no single member of the board of
directors owned more than .2% of the firm's common stock.Table 2
Ordinary least squares regressions of corporate performancemeasures
(Tobin's Qandthe profit rate) on measures of corporate assetsand
liabilities, including dummy variablesindicaing the level of equity





research & development -- 8.23** .242**
per dollar of assets (2.28) (.115)
advertising expenses .109 .0294
per dollar of assets (.795) (.0691)
long term debt per -- - . 851** -- - . 0681**
dollar of assets (.372) (.0302)
replacement cost -- - .00000181 -- .000000427
(dollar value of assets) (.00000383) (.000000337)
dummy set to one if .169** .201*** .00164 .00731 Oboard's stake <5% (.0820) (.0726) (.00537) (.00580)
dummy set to one if .249*** .286*** .0104* .0170**
5board's stake <20% (.0913) (.0935) (.00618) (.00688)
dummy set to one if .0332 .156** -.00147 .00500
board's stake20% (.0811) (.0759) (.00614) (.00724)
industry dummies for not included not included
3 digit SIC codes included included
number of firms in 371 371 315 315
the regression
R2 .0170 .590 .0143 .431
a *= significantat 90% confidence level
**= significantat 95% confidence level
=significantat 99% confidence level
bNumbers in brackets are consistentstandard errors calculated according to
White (1980).Table 3
1—statistics for the pairwise null hypotheses that the
coefficients on the ownership dummy variables estimated





fractionalequity and not and not
ownershipby the greater greater
board of directors negligible than 5 than 2O
greater than O and 2.77
not greater than 5%
greater than 5% and 3.06 .915
not greater than 20%
greater than 20% 2.06 .622 1.61Table 4
The average values of various measures of firm size fora 1980 sample
of 371 Fortune 500 firms. The firms are grouped basedon the fractional
equity ownership of the board of directors.
mean mean mean
replacement market value market value
management's number cost of get of the of equity
equity stake of firms assetsa, firmalb outstandingalb
negligible 46 9134 6795 5654
(1798) (1417) (1284)
0% to 5% 171 2194 1705 1407
(246) (195) (176)
5% to 10% 38 992 918 779
(163) (143) (142)
10% to 15% 27 2088 1374 1141
(884) (456) (369)
15% to 20% 15 1215 1043 878
(393) (341) (277)
20% to 25% 22 1693 1287 1005
(422) (334) (247)
25% to 30% 9 564 345 290
(116) (83) (74)
30% to 35% 6 3323 2177 1842
(1825) (1046) (958)
35% to 40% 11 1697 1741 1409
(1029) (886) (647)
40% to 45% 6 4815 2297 1136
(3737) (1334) (402)
45% to 50% 6 798 506 469
(220) (185) (183)
>50% 14 458 296 257
(118) (96) (87)
numbers in brackets are standard errors of the means
values are in millions of dollarsTable 5
Ordinary least squares regressions of corporate performance measures
(Tobin's Q and the profit rate) on measures of corporate assets and
liabilities, including dummy variables indicating the level of equity
ownership by the fir's top two officers and by the remainder of its
board of directorsa?
Q Q
research and development 8.72***
per dollar of assets (2.33)
advertising expenses
-.0315
per dollar of assets (.818)
**
longterm debt -.871
per dollar of assets (.374)
replacement cost
-.00000278
(dollar value of assets) (.00000378)
dummy set to one if 0% <stake .0361 .0603
of top two officers5% (.0866) (.0644)
dummy set to one if 5% <stake .0620 .0205
of top two officers20% (.122) (.0997)
dummy set to one if stake of -.0787 -.00728
top 2 officers exceeds 20% (.102) (.0884)
**
dummyset to one if 0% <stake .0706 .156
of outside board 5% (.0830) (.0627)
**
dummyset to one if 5% <stake .0585 .234
of outside board20% (.107) (.107)
*
dummyset to one if stake of -.0886 .171
outside board exceeds 20% (.115) (.101)
industry dummies for not included
3 digit SIC codes included
number of observations 371 371
R2 .008 .59]
a *= significantat 90% confidence level
**= significantat 95% confidence level
=significantat 99% confidence level
bNumbers in brackets are consistent standard errors calculated according to
White (1980).